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lines that material damage must have been caused as a result. It dismissed claims of

material damage where there was insufficient proof of the property destroyed or
its value.
This is a significant case. The judges took great care in identifying and applying the
precise pertinent rules of international law without lengthy discussion or undue judicial
activism. They relied on the views of leading Greek international law academics 2 7 and
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of Greece. The views they adopted also reflect
Greek foreign policy. The Greek Foreign Office itself has relied on these rules in a
similar manner in its diplomatic exchanges with Germany. Thus, it would indeed be
strange if decisions of other Greek courts expressed different views.
Furthermore, even though the court determined that Germany was acting under jus
imperii, it categorically noted that there are exceptions to sovereign immunity where
rules of jus cogens are violated.
This case highlights the difficulties arising from claims for reparation for damage
caused in international armed conflict, particularly when raised by individuals before
their national courts. Although the court stressed the jus cogens obligations arising out
of the law of belligerent occupation and Germany's treaty obligations to redress injured
states, Germany has consistently refused to offer any such redress. This issue could also
be addressed through diplomatic channels, perhaps leading to agreed arbitration. In the
present state of affairs, however, it is unlikely that Germany will offer any compensation to
these victims of World War II atrocities, since this could open the floodgates to other
similar claims.28
ILAs BANTEKAS

School of Law, University of Westminster
ForeignSovereign Immunities Act-denial of immunity for extrajudicialkilling-Cuban liability
for shooting down civil aircraft-punitivedamages-retroactiveapplicationof statute recognizing cause of actionfor human rights violations

996 F.Supp. 1239.
U.S. District Court, S.D. Fla., December 17, 1997.
ALEJANDRE v. REPUBLIC OF CUBA.

On February 24, 1996, the Cuban Air Force deliberately shot down two unarmed civil
aircraft piloted by members of the Miami-based organization Brothers to the Rescue.
The incident resulted in the loss of four lives and evoked widespread international
condemnation. It prompted Congress to enact the controversial Helms-Burton Act on
March 12, 1996,2 tightening the U.S. embargo against Cuba in effect since 1962.3 The
6

2 Judgment at 17.

Reference was also made to scholarly opinions of foreign international jurists.
It appears that the measures taken by Germany with respect to the victims of genocide may be distinguished
in some respects from the position Germany has taken regarding injuries occasioned by military operations
and military occupation as such.
' See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 90 AJIL 442, 448-54 (1996);
SC Res. 1067, paras. 2, 6 (July 26, 1996); Resolution Adopted by the Council of the International Civil Aviation
Organization at the Tenth Meeting of Its 147th Session on March 6, 1996, reproduced as Appendix A to
International Civil Aviation Organization, Report of the Investigation Regarding the Shooting Down of Two
U.S.-Registered Private Civil Aircraft by Cuban Military Aircraft on 24 February 1996, Doc. C-WP/10441
(1996); Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. CarlJohan Groth, in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1996/69 and Economic and Social Council Decision
1996/275, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/53, para. 37 (1997).
2 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§6021-6091, 1643, and 28 U.S.C. §1611 (Supp. II 1996)). See Agora: Te Cuban Liberty
and DemocraticSolidarity (LIEERTAD) Act, 90 AJIL 419 (1996).
' Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (1962). SeeAndreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The HelmsBurton Act, 90 AJIL 419, 420-22 (1996).
5
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next month Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996,1 which amended the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) to make Libya,
Cuba and certain other states more amenable to suit in federal court for egregious
human rights violations.5 In September 1996, Congress approved the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997.6 Section 589
of that Act creates a cause of action for the human rights violations for which the
Antiterrorism Act amendments deny immunity. In the first case decided under the new
statutes, a federal district court in Miami, after trial,7 awarded over $187 million in
compensatory and punitive damages against the Cuban Government and Air Force to
the families of the American victims.
The court found that an amendment to the FSIA added by the Antiterrorism Act
provided an exception to sovereign immunity applicable retroactively to this case.8 Section 1605(a) (7) of the FSIA deprives a foreign state of immunity from suit if six basic
requirements are satisfied. 9 First, the action must be "for personal injury or death," as
was the case here. Second, the injury must have been "caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support" for such activities. The court held the deaths of the pilots to be "extrajudicial
killings," as defined by the Torture Victim Protection Act, which the FSIA incorporates
by reference. 10 Third, the extrajudicial killing must be caused by an "official, employee,
or agent" of the foreign state acting within the scope of "his or her office, employment,
or agency." The court found that the "Cuban Air Force was acting as an agent of Cuba
when it committed the killings."'" Fourth, the United States must have designated the
foreign state as a "state sponsor of terrorism."' 2 Cuba, together with six other countries,
has been so designated.' 3 Fifth, the claimant or victim must have been a U.S. national
when the extrajudicial killing occurred.14 One of the victims had Cuban nationality and
was barred from bringing suit; the other plaintiffs and victims were U.S. citizens. Sixth,
the extrajudicial killing must have taken place outside the territory of the foreign state;
5
The court found that the
otherwise, an arbitration requirement must be satisfied.'
6
waters.'
planes had been shot down over international
Pub. L. No. 104-132, §221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§1605(a), 1610(a) (Supp.
II 1996)) [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act]. See generally Leslie McKay, A New Take on Antiterrorism: Smith v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 13 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 439 (1997).
-28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1602-1611 (1994).
"Pub. L. No. 104-208, §589, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1605 note (Supp. II 1996))
[hereinafter Foreign Operations Act].
7Cuba did not appear. It sent a diplomatic note to the Department of State asserting that the court had
no jurisdiction over it. 996 F.Supp. 1239, 1242 & n.1. Under 28 U.S.C. §1608(e), default judgments against
foreign states are prohibited.
' Antiterrorism Act, supra note 4, §221(c), 110 Stat. at 1243; Alejandre, 996 F.Supp. at 1250 n.9.
For other limitations, see 28 U.S.C. §1605(f), (g) (1994).
' 28 U.S.C. §1605(e) (1). See 28 U.S.C. §1350 note ("extrajudicial killing" is "a deliberated killing not
authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people").
" 996 F.Supp. at 1248. The court looked to general common law principles in determining agency under
the Foreign Operations Act. Id. In addition, it apparently assumed that the term "agent," see 28 U.S.C. §1605
note (referring to "[a] n official, employee, or agent of a foreign state. . . acting within the scope of his or
her office, employment, or agency") includes entities other than individuals. While the reference to "his or
her" might suggest otherwise, the better explanation is that the Act, part of a grab bag of appropriations and
other statutes enacted right before the new fiscal year, was badly drafted.
S' 28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (7) (A) (referring to designation by Secretary of State under the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, §620A, 22 U.S.C. §2371 (a), or the Export Administration Act of 1979, §6(j), 50 U.S.C. App. §2405(j)).
See 47 Fed. Reg. 16,623 (1982) (Cuba); 31 C.F.R §596.201 (1997) (current list) (Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan and Syria).
"28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (7) (B) (ii).
See 28 U.S.C. §1605 (a) (7) (B) (i) (when "the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has
been brought," that state is immune if "the claimant has not afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity
to arbitrate the claim in accordance with accepted international rules of arbitration").
"' 996 F.Supp. at 1248. Cf International Civil Aviation Organization, supra note 1, at 90-91 (same).
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Having established subject matter jurisdiction, the court turned to liability. The claims8
17
here were not based on the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act,'
but on the Foreign Operations Act. That Act makes an "official, employee, or agent"
of a state designated by the United States as a sponsor of terrorism liable to a U.S.
national for "personal injury or death" caused by "torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft
sabotage, [or] hostage taking" 19 carried out within the official's or agent's scope of
employment. 20 The court found that the Cuban Air Force, acting under orders of state
officials, had deliberately shot down the civilian planes in international waters without
any attempt to warn or intercept them. This action, the court held, satisfied the requirements of the Foreign Operations Act. The court then found the Cuban Government as
well as the Cuban Air Force liable for the death of the three pilots under respondeat
22
supeior,2 1 holding that the Act properly applied to events before its enactment.
The court awarded plaintiffs a total of nearly $50 million in compensatory damages
against the Cuban Government and Air Force. These damages reflected loss of future
income-earning potential as well as pain and suffering by the three pilots, and pain and
suffering and loss of companionship by their immediate families. 23 The court also
awarded punitive damages against the Cuban Air Force pursuant to an express provision
in the Foreign Operations Act.24 That the killings were "premeditated and intentional,
outside of Cuban territory, wholly disproportionate, and executed without warning or
process," the court held, "makes this act unique in its brazen flouting of international
norms." 25 It arrived at a figure of $137.7 million by estimating the value of the Cuban
Air Force's 102 MIG fighter jets to be $4.59 billion, and then setting damages at 1
percent of that total, or $45.9 million, as to each of the three pilots.26

Most human rights claims have been brought against individual violators, not states.
The FSLA's major exceptions to immunity typically do not cover human rights claims.
These limitations may reflect a congressional determination that, however desirable it
might be for human rights victims to have access to a judicial forum, the federal courts
cannot serve as the tribunal in which foreign plaintiffs regularly seek a remedy against
'728 U.S.C. §1350 (1994).
'Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 note (1994)).
'928 U.S.C. §1605 (a) (7) (incorporated by reference in 28 U.S.C. §1605 note).
20 The requirements specified in §1605 (a) (7) must also be satisfied, and no action may be maintained if a
U.S. official, acting within the scope of his or her employment, "would not be liable for such acts if carried
out within the United States." 28 U.S.C. §1605 note.
21996 F.Supp. at 1247-49.
2' 3Id. at 1250 n.9.
The damages were divided roughly equally among the three sets of plaintiffs. Id. at 1249--50.
24 28 U.S.C. §1605 note. Punitive damages could not be awarded against Cuba, a foreign state. 28 U.S.C.
§1606. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to award punitive damages against the Cuban
Air Force as an "agency or instrumentality" of Cuba. 996 F.Supp. at 1249 n.8 (citing 28 U.S.C. §1606 ("a
foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages")). The
court apparently treated its conclusion that the Air Force was an "agency" of the Cuban Government under
the Foreign Operations Act as sufficient to determine that it was an "agency or instrumentality" under the
FSIA's provision permitting punitive damages against such entities. It did not address whether the Air Force
is a "separate legal person, corporate or otherwise," as specified in 28 U.S.C. §1603(b) (1). Id. C mpareMarlowe
v. Argentine Naval Comm'n, 604 F.Supp. 703, 706-07 (D.D.C. 1985) (Argentine Naval Commission, a part
of the Navy, is a foreign state, not agency or instrumentality), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 808 F.2d 120
(D.C. Cir. 1986) with Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air Force, 475 F.Supp. 396, 403 (D.N.J. 1979) (Air
Force "is an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, Iran").
2 996 F.Supp. at 1252.
26
1 d. at 1253. That the MIGs were used to kill civilians made it apt to award a portion (1%) of the fleet's
value for each death. Of course, if all that stood between most governments and bankruptcy were one hundred
serious human rights violations, national insolvency would be the order of the day. Alejandrs approach is
most appropriate where the state consistently violates human rights but is unlikely to be held accountable.
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their own government. Doing so might well interfere with the conduct of foreign policy
generally.27
To be sure, this determination represents a degree of subordination of human rights
to foreign policy and other concerns. A commitment to human rights, however, need
not be absolute and exclusive of all other interests. Still, a broad balancing is one thing;
a practice of selective exceptions to immunity, another. If pressed far enough, such a
practice could transform human rights suits against foreign sovereigns into nothing
more than a tool of U.S. foreign policy.
Not all exceptions to immunity raise such concerns. The FSIA permits a foreign state to
be sued if, for example, it assassinates a political dissident in the United States. 28 The human
rights principle is easily discernible: a foreign state cannot reasonably expect immunity in
U.S. courts if it wages war against its own people on U.S. soil. Congress could add to the
list of exceptions. It might provide that any violation of a U.S. citizen's human rights by a
foreign sovereign could be adjudicated in U.S. courts. 29 Or it might amend the FSIA to
provide what some claimants have unsuccessfully argued: that there is no immunity for
violations of peremptory norms.'
One might ask whether the Antiterrorism Act embodies a principled exception of its
own. Its provision of enhanced protection to U.S. nationals might suggest that it does.
But the Act is troubling in three respects. First, "terrorism" is at best a questionable and
uncertain category of human rights violation. Second, the Antiterrorism Act does not strip
state sponsors of terrorism of their immunity; rather, it denies immunity to states designated by the U.S. Government as state sponsors of terrorism. Any such official list may
well be heavily influenced by factors unrelated to terrorism or human rights, as the varying
treatment of Iraq over the years demonstrates.31 Third, the FSIA requires no link between
the status of a state as a sponsor of terrorism and the particular wrongful injury or death
for which immunity is denied. The Antiterrorism and Foreign Operations Acts appear to
treat torture and murder as worse when committed by some states than by others.
It would be unrealistic to expect strategic foreign policy considerations to play no role
in the handling of human rights matters by the political branches. It would be unfortunate, however, if the judiciary's role in redressing human rights violations abroad were
subordinated to the aim of punishing states on an enemies list-in fact or appearance.
of honor" that the Alien Tort Statute and
To do so would risk tarnishing the "badge
2
Torture Victim Protection Act represent?
Given this risk, courts may wish to approach the question of retroactivity with great
care, particularly where legislation is heavily influenced by outrage over recent events.
Under Landgrafv. USIFilm Products, a statute is "retroactive" if it "would impair rights
a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose
new duties with. respect to transactions already completed." 3 Of course, even if a statute
would not be retroactive in this sense, Congress might still make it prospective. Alterna27In addition, the current relatively small burden on the federal courts' caseload-a product in part of the
difficulties of obtaining personal jurisdiction over individual defendants-might increase dramatically. And
other states might respond by attempting to narrow the United States' immunity in their own courts.
28 U.S.C. §1605(a) (5). See, e.g., Lu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
See Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 581 (1993).
"E.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1996).
' When the United States placed Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1982, it removed Iraq
from the list at the same time, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,623 (1982) (Cuba); 47 Fed. Reg. 9201 (1982) (Iraq); see 21
ILM 853 (1982), and, apparently as part of a further tilt toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war that had begun in
September 1980, placed Iran on the list two years later, 49 Fed. Reg. 2836 (1984); see Bernard Gwertzman,
PresidentAffirms His Policy to Keep Marines in Beirut, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 1984, at Al. Iraq was then returned to
the list after it invaded Kuwait. 57 Fed. Reg. 4553 (1992). Cf Re, supranote 29, at 584 (stating that FSIA "was
enacted to depoliticize the sovereign immunity decision process").
I-'Anne-Marie [Slaughter] Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83
AJIL 461 (1989).
."511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994).
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tively, Congress may impose civil liability retroactively if it makes its intention manifest.
In the absence of evidence of intent one way or the other, there is a presumption against
retroactive application. 4
The Alejandre court looked first to the language of the statutes. The Antiterrorism Act
amendments to the FSIA apply to "any cause of action arising before, on, or after" the
date of their enactment.3 5 But liability was not based on the FSIA; the amendments
merely provided subject matter jurisdiction and denied immunity. 6 Instead, plaintiffs
"base[d] their substantive cause of action" on the Foreign Operations Act. 7 That Act
has no express provision on retroactivity.
The absence of an express provision should have led the court to examine the legislative history of the Foreign Operations Act.3s Section 589 was added in conference; the
conferees stated that they "intend that this section shall apply to cases pending upon
enactment of this Act.",3 9 This statement suggests that Congress, aware of the recent
holding in.Landgraf40 determined that section 589 was retroactive, but nevertheless
specified that it should apply to preenactment causes of action pending on September
30, 1996. Because the Alejandre complaints were filed on October 31, 1996, 4, application
of the Foreign Operations Act appears questionable.42
If Landgrafapplied, the court's holding might rest on firmer ground. A fundamental reason
for Landgraf's presumption against retroactivity certainly does not apply here: Cuba could
not reasonably deny that it had fair notice that its actions violated basic norms of humanity.
On the other hand, the Foreign Operations Act may have "increase[d] ...[Cuba's] liability
for past conduct' 43 by creating a new cause of action for American citizens not previously
available under the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim Protection Act. The HouseSenate conferees ambiguously characterized section 589 as "expanding the scope of monetary
damage awards available to American victims of international terrorism. ' '44
4 See Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2062-63, 2064 n.4 (1997).

'Antiterrorism Act, supra note 4, §221(c), 110 Stat. at 1243.
' Thus, they may not be truly "retroactive." Alejandre, 996 F.Supp. at 1250 n.9; Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274.
996 F.Supp. at 1249.
38 Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2062 (rejecting view that "in the absence of an express command regarding temporal
reach," courts must apply Landgrafpresumption "to the exclusion of all other standards of statutory interpretation"). Instead, the Alejandrecourtsimply concluded that neither the amendments to the FSIA nor the Foreign
Operations Act is retroactive under Landgraf because both are "jurisdictional provisions." 996 F.Supp. at
1250 n.9. While this characterization may be correct as to the FSIA, it is less clear as to the Foreign Operations
Act. As to its effect, see Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex reL Schumer, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 1878 (1997)
(rejecting view that "absent a clear statement of congressional intent, there is a strong presumption in favor
of retroactivity for jurisdictional statutes").
S9 CoNF.REP. ON H.R. 3610, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS, reprintedin 142 CONG. REc. HI 1,915
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
40 Cf Lindh, 117 S.Ct. at 2064 (Congress may well have taken Landgrafintoaccount in formulating retroactivity
provisions of the Antiterrorism Act).
41
Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, Nos. 96-10126-Civ-King, 96-10127-Civ-King, 96-10128-Civ-King, Docket
Sheets (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 1996). There apparently was at least one case pending as of September 30, 1996. See Smith
v. Socialist People's Libyan AabJanmahiriy4, 101 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 1996); Rein v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiiya, 995 FSupp. 325 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Cf McKay, supra note 4, at 454 (concern over bombings of Pan Am
Flight 103, World Trade Center, and Oklahoma City a factor in adoption of Antiterrorism Act).
Two other interpretations are possible. First, Congress might have been uncertain whether the statute
would create or expand liability for past conduct. It might have left that question to the courts, on the
condition that if a court did conclude that the Act was retroactive under Landgraf it should still apply the
Act to all pre-enactment causes of action pending on September 30, 1996. This interpretation would be
consistent with applying the Act to Alejandre's facts only if the court was correct in concluding that the Act
did not create or expand liability for past conduct. Second, Congress might have believed that the statute
simply did not create or expand liability for past conduct. If so, no policy would be served by refusing to apply
the Act to the facts in Alejandre. Unlike the interpretation offered in text, however, both these alternatives
assume that Congress chose a rather obscure form in which to express its intentions.
43Landgraf 511 U.S. at 280.
44CoNF. REP. ON H.R. 3610, supra note 39, at H11,915. One might view international law iself as having
already provided for liability, with the FSIA simply affording claimants a forum. Although one might generally
also view the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act as providing for liability for human
17
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Alejandre may stand for a more relaxed approach to retroactivity where a peremptory
norm is violated.45 There is some merit to that approach in compensating victims.
(Whether plaintiffs will be able to execute on the judgment is, of course, another question. ' ) Imposing punishment through punitive damages, however, is a different matter.
Even defendants who have committed terrible wrongs should not be punished by an ex
post facto statute, not because they are unworthy of punishment, but because "the
judicial guarantees. . . recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" forbid it.47 In
Xuncax v. Gramajo, the court declined to award punitive damages under the Torture
Victim Protection Act even against a defendant who, "at a minimum. . . was aware of
and supported widespread acts of brutality committed by personnel under his command
resulting in thousands of civilian deaths."48 The court concluded that awarding punitive
damages under that statute-enacted after the events in question and silent as to retroactive application-would raise a "serious constitutional question," 9 even though punitive
damages had already been available under other sources of law.50
The presumption against retroactivity also helps ensure that legislation is well considered. Congress would be remiss if it did not take recent events into account, but it may
be unduly influenced by its reaction to past events if it assumes that proposed legislation
will apply to them. If the Antiterrorism and Foreign Operations Acts do turn out to
herald a new wave of particularized exceptions to sovereign immunity, the courts may
need to give careful thought to the matter before applying them retroactively.
STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY*

University of Miami School of Law
rights violations, neither would apply to the Alejandreplaintiffs' cause of action against Cuba and the Air Force.
Only aliens can bring claims under the Alien Tort Statute, and only individuals may be sued under the Torture
Victim Protection Act.
SeeAlejandre, 996 F.Supp. at 1252 (holding ban on extrajudicial killing to bejus cogens).
See 28 U.S.C. §1610(a) (7) (broadening exception to immunity from attachment and execution). If they
cannot, the size of the awards suggests that a post-Castro government might insist that they be resolved as
part of a larger settlement of outstanding claims with the United States. There may be some doubt, however,
about the President's (or even Congress's) ability to compromise judgments rendered by a federal court. See
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688-90 (1981) (declining on ripeness grounds to consider whether
suspension of claims against Iran constituted a taking). See generally Abfahim-Youri v. United States, 139 F.3d
1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Shanghai Power Co. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 237 (1983), affid mem, 765 F.2d 159
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
7
Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §1350 note. Cf., e.g., Annual Report of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights 1996, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7, rev., at 671, 687 (1997) (faulting Cuba for
disrespecting right "to be judged based on provisions of criminal law enacted prior to when the offense was
alleged"); AfCommHPR, Opinion of Mar. 22, 1995 (Comm. 101/93), AHG/Res. 240 (XXXI) (June 28, 1995),
r"intedin 18 HuM. RTs. LJ. 31 (1997) (faulting Nigeria for retroactive application of criminal law). It seems
inadequate, therefore, simply to justify retroactive imposition of punitive damages as "secondary" to the
"primary purpose" of creating a remedy for victims of terrorism, as did Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
999 F.Supp. 1, 27 (D.D.C. 1998), in awarding $225 million in punitive damages.
: 886 F.Supp. 162, 172 (D. Mass. 1995).
" Id. at 200. See also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 281 ("The very labels given 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages,
as well as the rationales that support them, demonstrate that they share key characteristics of criminal sanctions.
Retroactive imposition of punitive damages would raise a serious constitutional question."). See also Rein v.
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 995 F.Supp. 325, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (generally rejecting constitutional challenge to retroactive amendments to FSIA, but reserving for later any decision on constitutionality
of retroactive imposition of punitive damages).
See 886 F.Supp. at 200-02 (awarding punitive damages under Guatemalan and Kentucky law).
The author served as an expert witness on international human rights law in this case, testifying on behalf
of the plaintiffs.

